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Abstract 
The European Union’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans may be facing its most difficult 
challenge since its launch in Zagreb in 2000. The prospect of Balkan enlargement has been hard-hit by 
the deterioration of the European economy, and particularly the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The 
countries of the region have been deeply affected by the shock waves emanating from the Greek and 
eurozone crises: the negative repercussions include a deterioration of their economies, their prospects 
for growth, their capacity for reform, their social, political and institutional structures, and their ability 
to fulfill the accession criteria. Crucially, the EU’s hitherto undisputable symbolic role as an “anchor” 
of stability, as a one-way path to prosperity and as a goal to be aspired to, may be losing its credibility 
and appeal for some of these countries. 
Keywords 
Balkans, EU enlargement, Eurozone crisis, Greek crisis. 
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Introduction 
The process of the European Union’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans may be facing its 
most difficult challenge since its launch in Zagreb in 2000. The prospect of Balkan enlargement has 
been hard-hit by the deterioration of the global - and European - economy, with serious ramifications 
for both partners in the negotiation process. The negative repercussions of the economic crisis on the 
Western Balkans are evident on many levels, including the impact on the economies per se, their 
prospects for growth, their capacity for reform, their social, political and institutional structures, and 
their abilities to fulfill the accession criteria. All these factors, coupled with a growing “enlargement 
fatigue”, which set in after the extraordinary rounds of enlargement during the period 2004-2007, have 
created a particularly unfavourable environment within which enlargement is being pursued. 
Moreover, this perceived dampening of enthusiasm for enlargement, combined with a growing 
“evaluation fatigue” on the part of the candidate countries, has fed these countries’ frustration and 
disenchantment, as the prospect of accession seems more and more remote.  
This paper will explore the impact of the economic crisis on the Western Balkan countries, and 
how the new, unfavourable international environment is affecting their accession prospects. The 
analysis will be presented in three sections: the first part will examine the effect of the first wave of 
the global economic crisis on the economies of the region, specifically the impact on the region’s 
macroeconomic indicators, foreign direct investment flows, the financial sector, etc. This first wave 
reversed much of the progress these countries had achieved over the past few years, and thus made 
them even more vulnerable to the upcoming shocks. Part two will analyse the repercussions of the 
second wave of the crisis, namely the Greek sovereign debt crisis, which rapidly spilled over into the 
entire eurozone. As the paper argues, the high interdependence of most Western Balkan countries with 
Greece has made the region exceptionally vulnerable to the shock waves emanating from the Greek 
crisis. In fact, it is difficult to overestimate the seriousness of the Greek crisis on the Western Balkan 
countries: its impact transcends issues that are purely financial or economic or relating to EU 
membership, but has far-reaching social and geopolitical implications concerning the stability of the 
region as well. Moreover, due to the intense “euroisation” of the Western Balkan economies, these 
countries are also deeply affected by the profound crisis underway in the eurozone. The third part will 
discuss the repercussions of the crisis on the region’s accession process and prospects. It will be 
argued that in addition to contributing to the deterioration of economic conditions in these countries, 
both dimensions of the crisis (eurozone and Greek crisis) have a deep and lasting negative impact on 
the Western Balkans’ EU accession prospects. Essentially, on many interlinked and interdependent 
levels, the eurozone and Greek crises are modifying the conditions in which the process of EU 
enlargement is taking place. The paper will attempt to analyse the dynamic whereby the repercussions 
and the fallout from the crisis create new realities - such as the slowing down of the reform process, a 
growing enlargement (and evaluation) fatigue, the questioning of the EU “convergence narrative”, the 
discrediting of the Balkan region - that will in turn threaten the enlargement process. Finally, it will be 
proposed that although the EU’s role in the Western Balkans remains crucial (not least as a provider of 
economic assistance) its hitherto undisputable symbolic role as an “anchor” of stability, as a one-way 
path to prosperity and as a goal to be aspired to may be losing its appeal for some of these countries. 
The impact of the crisis on the Western Balkan countries came in two waves. The first wave was 
the period 2008-2011, when the region was exposed to the full brunt of the global economic crisis. By 
the end of 2011, however, just as some level of stabilisation had been achieved and GDP was on the 
upswing again, the second wave came, when the full scale and depth of Greek sovereign debt crisis 
was revealed and the drama unfolded on a European level. Due to large-scale economic 
interdependence with Greece, the Western Balkan countries were sucked into the vortex of Greece’s 
unraveling economy, from which there is still no end in sight.  
Ritsa Panagiotou 
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I. The first wave: the global financial crisis 
It was clear from the beginning that the global financial crisis would not by-pass the Balkans, and by 
late 2008 the region was bracing for the inevitable. As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph 
Stiglitz said during a visit to Belgrade in 2008, “the region cannot avoid the global crisis… some 
countries will be hit directly on the trade level, others because of the fall of the price of raw 
materials… this crisis began at the centre, in the US, but the periphery will be hit the most, because 
exports and direct foreign investment will suffer. The region depends on Europe, which will suffer 
even greater consequences than the US”.1  
The economic crisis hit the Balkan region just as it was consolidating the progress it had made after 
emerging from years of war, political instability and painful economic reform programmes. For most 
countries in the region, the period 2003-2007 was one of the strongest in more than a decade, with 
annual real GDP growth averaging about 6%, while the region also received large inflows of FDI in 
2003-2007.
2
 The economic slowdown in EU countries – the main recipients of Balkan exports – and 
the decreased influx of foreign direct investment triggered the first symptoms of the crisis in the region 
by the last quarter of 2008. By mid 2009 the effects on the financial sector were being felt more 
strongly, particularly with a slowdown in foreign bank lending activities.
3
 
The spreading of the crisis followed the predictable pattern whereby the lack of financing meant 
slower development, lower demand in the world market meant shrinking exports, while decreased 
output meant lower public revenues.
4
 In fact, the growth model that had been implemented over the 
past few years in Southeast Europe, combined with the institutional weaknesses which was evident in 
most of these countries, had left the region vulnerable to external shocks in several respects. It had not 
managed exchange rates in a way that preserved a wide margin of competitiveness so as to support 
export-led growth and build up external reserves to very high levels. Capital controls had been 
removed quite early, while there had been a rapid expansion of lending to households, often by foreign 
banks and in foreign currencies. Moreover, high levels of current account deficits fuelled by rapid 
credit expansion – in a setting where structural policies were still lagging – had exacerbated the 
exposure of economies to the crisis in global markets.
5
 
Macroeconomic deterioration 
The first years of the crisis were characterised by falling GDP, rising unemployment rates, declining 
rates of investment, falling industrial output and growing current account deficits. The economies of 
the region contracted significantly in 2009, resulting in negative GDP growth rates in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (-2.9 percent), Croatia (-5.9 percent), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM, -0.9 percent), Montenegro (-5.7 percent) and Serbia (-3.5 percent) (Figure 1). Albania also 
faced a slowdown in growth (3.3 percent, down from 7.5 percent in 2008), but was the least impacted 
by the crisis due to the low volume of Albanian exports and comparatively low level of integration 
into the international economy. The strong growth levels of the previous years had been based on 
robust domestic demand fuelled by excessive credit growth in household consumption and mortgage 
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services. The sharp slowdown indicated inter alia that consumer demand was radically adjusting 
downward, with credit availability frozen and debt repayments becoming more commonplace.
6
  
Figure 1: Western Balkans, GDP growth rates 
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Figure 2: Western Balkans, Unemployment rates 
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Unemployment, which was already very high in the region - more than twice the West European 
average - continued to rise as the significant fall in exports resulted in the closure of many companies. 
Unemployment figures for 2009 stood at 13.1 percent for Albania, 25 percent for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
9.1 percent for Croatia, 32.1 percent for FYROM, 15.2 percent for Montenegro, and 17.4 percent for 
Serbia (Figure 2). Significantly, in most countries the unemployment rate for those under 30 years old 
was almost 50 percent.
 7
 The rate of unemployment increased further in 2010, as the impact of the 
crisis deepened and widened: thus, in Bosnia- Herzegovina it grew to 27 percent, in Croatia to 12.2 
percent, and in Serbia to 20 percent, while the figures for Albania, Montenegro and FYROM remained 
approximately at the same level as 2009. 
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As the region’s traditional export markets contracted, it was increasingly difficult to keep the state 
budgets in balance.
8
 The characteristically high current account deficits all over the region 
significantly increased the countries’ economic vulnerability, necessitating a fiscal tightening which 
together with the poor external economic outlook hit Serbia, Croatia, FYROM and Bosnia-
Herzegovina particularly hard. The current account deficits as a percentage of GDP in 2009 ranged 
from 30.1 percent in Montenegro to 5.2 percent in Croatia.
9
  
Table 1: GDP per capita in 2010 ($US) (nominal and Purchasing Power Parity- adjusted  
Country GDP per 
capita  
GDP per capita  
(PPP-adjusted) 
 Country GDP per capita  GDP per capita  
(PPP-adjusted) 
       
Albania 3,714.6 7,468.2  Bulgaria 6,359.4 12,965.1 
B-H 4,254.8 7,816.1  Romania 7,667.2 11,904.0 
Croatia 13,775.9 17,818.6  Czech Republic 18,813.9 26,121.7 
FYROM 4,457.5 9,868.1  Hungary 12,845.4 18,809.5 
Montenegro 6.383.3 10,601.2  Poland 12,285.6 18,950.7 
Serbia 5,141.7 10,257.7  Slovak Republic 16,049.8 22,121.7 
    Slovenia 23,281.5 28,131.1 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2012. 
Decline in remittances 
Another important impact of the crisis was the decline in remittances. Migrant workers’ transfers in 
the Balkans constitute a major economic force: in the years before the crisis Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were among the top twenty countries in the world in terms of 
remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP. In 2008, remittances as a share of GDP had reached 17.2 
percent in Bosnia, 16.5 percent in Kosovo, 14 percent in Serbia and 12 percent in Albania.
10
 In 2010, 
Albania’s stock of emigrants numbered 1.4 million (45.4% of the population), whose countries of 
destination have been Greece, Italy, FYROM, Germany, UK, France and the US. Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s stock of emigrants was 1.4 million (38.9 percent of the population) heading mostly to 
Croatia, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden, Italy and Switzerland. Most remittance flows to 
FYROM come from Germany and Italy. 
Table 2: Western Balkan Remittances (US$ mn) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 % of 
GDP in 
2010 
Albania 889 1,161 1,290 1,359 1,468 1,495 1,317 1,156 1,221 10.9 
B-H 1,749 2,072 2,043 2,157 2,700 2,735 2,167 1,906 2,021 12.9 
Croatia 517 665 711 859 1,194 1,292 1,271 1,287 1,236 2.1 
FYROM 174 213 227 267 345 407 381 388 435 3.9 
Montenegro - - - - 196 298 302 301 334 7.5 
Serbia - - 2,650 2,754 3,064 2,710 3,936 3,351 3,719 10.4 
Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2011 
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The economic crisis, however, which led to significant layoffs elsewhere in Europe, adversely affected 
the migrant workers’ continued ability to transfer important amounts to their home countries. Many of 
these labourers were employed in sectors hit by the recession in their host countries, particularly in car 
manufacturing, construction and household work. A decline in remittances from relatives working 
abroad has affected families in the countries of origin and their income expectations and also impacted 
on countries’ foreign currency holdings, medium-term budgetary planning and the financing of high 
current account deficits. As can be seen in Table 2, the countries most affected by a decline in 
remittances after 2008 are Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Spillover from neighbouring countries in crisis  
As small, open economies - more than one fifth of economic output and employment is based on 
exports - the Western Balkan countries were especially vulnerable to the effects of the world crisis, 
especially the fall in global growth and trade. The euro area countries are the main trading partners for 
the region, accounting for about half of all exports on average - slightly more in the case of Albania 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and slightly less for Serbia, which has relatively strong trade links with 
Russia and other emerging European economies. Within the euro area, Italy is generally the most 
important export market for the region, especially for Albania, while Greece is the most important 
export market for Montenegro. Trade linkages with the rest of the euro area are mostly dominated by 
Germany.  
Since the EU member states constitute the most important trade partners for these countries, the 
deteriorating conditions in the EU - leading inter alia to falling consumer demand - had a particularly 
detrimental effect on exports to traditional markets and cross border trade relations. For example, due 
to reduced foreign demand, FYROM’s metallurgical industries were operating on 50% of their 
capacities for a great part of 2009, leading to a large fall in production as well as massive layoffs. 
Croatia, whose tourism industry is a major source of income and is mostly powered by citizens of EU 
countries, also lost important revenue as the economic downturn led to a dramatic fall in tourism.  
Due to its dependence on steel and metal exports, the region was also hit hard by the global slump 
in manufacturing and commodity prices in the world market. The price of metals fell by almost two-
thirds between 2008 and 2009, contributing further to the slowdown in the region’s economies. Thus, 
Serbia, who relies massively on exports of food and raw materials such as copper and iron (which 
make up 40% of total exports) suffered not only from the fall in demand of these products but also 
because of the dramatic fall in the price of copper in 2008.
11
 US Steel, one of Serbia’s leading 
exporters, was one of many companies to close a large plant in 2009. Similarly, in FYROM, Silmak - 
a significant producer of ferro-nickel - cut production and lay off workers due to the drastic fall in 
ferro-nickel’s price on the world markets. Finally, the Western Balkan economies were greatly 
affected by the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in mid-2008 over gas prices, which reduced 
energy supply to the region and forced the region’s heavy industry to cut production and even halt 
assembly lines. 
Declining foreign direct investment 
With relatively low labour costs and easy access to European markets, the region has attracted 
significant foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years. Most of this investment has come from 
Europe, with the euro area accounting for about 70 percent of the total stock of FDI in the region. Italy 
is a major investor in the region, especially in Albania where it accounts for 80 percent of the total but 
also in Montenegro, while Greece also has significant investments in Albania, FYROM and Serbia.  
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Revenues from foreign investments had played a very important role in the economic growth 
achieved in the region during the period 2003-2007: they contributed inter alia to infrastructure 
projects, the privatisation process, balancing the budget and the financing of foreign debt payments. 
Consequently, the sharp decline in foreign direct investment after 2008 – caused mainly by the 
economic downturn in the investing countries – has had a seriously detrimental effect on the national 
economies in the region.
12
 FDI flows to the region decreased by 34 percent between 2008 and 2009, 
with total flows declining from US$12.6 billion to US$ 8.3 (Table 3).
 
Bosnia and Croatia were 
particularly hit: Bosnia experienced a 75 percent decline in FDI, from US$ 1.0 billion to US$ 251 
million, while FDI in Croatia fell by 46 percent, from US$ 6.2 billion to US$ 3.3 billion.
13
  
Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment Flows in the Western Balkans (US$ mn)  
 
 
1995-2004 
(annual 
average) 
2005-2007 
(annual 
average) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Albania 130  415  974  996 1,051 1,031 
Bosnia 186  908 1,002  251 230  435 
Croatia 1,013  3,430  6,180 3,355 394 1,494 
FYROM 152  407  586  201 211  422 
Montenegro 19  686  960 1,527 760  558 
Serbia   411 3,091  2,955 1,959 1,329 2,709 
Total 1,911 8,937 12,657 8,289 3,975 6,649 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: World Investment 
Report 2012. 
An important example of lost FDI was the case of FIAT in Serbia: in September 2008, FIAT had 
signed a €1 billion joint investment agreement in Belgrade, which was hailed as a landmark project 
and was expected to create nearly 5,000 jobs. By February 2009, FIAT had announced that a sizeable 
proportion of this investment would be postponed, citing concerns about the state of the international 
automotive industry. Another example is that of Bangalore property developer The Embassy Group, 
which despite having scheduled an investment of more than US$ 500 million in the country, 
announced that it was being put on hold. Overall, investment in Serbia fell from US$ 2.9 billion in 
2008 to US$1.9 billion in 2009. The Czech energy company CEZ and the Norwegian power utility 
Statkraft both withdrew from major projects in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There 
were many other similar examples of major investment projects that had been approved before the full 
impact of the crisis was felt, and then red-lighted and shelved. The decrease in revenues from foreign 
investments also caused serious difficulties in servicing these countries external debt, which as a 
percentage of GDP in 2009 stood at 60 percent for Albania, 36 percent for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 23.8 
percent for FYROM, 38.2 percent for Serbia, 40.1 percent for Montenegro, and 34.5 percent for 
Croatia.
14
 
The situation deteriorated even further in 2010. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 
2011, Croatia received only US$ 394 million of FDI in 2010, compared to US$ 3.3 billion in 2009 
(which was already down from US$ 6.2 billion in 2008).
15
 For the first time, Croatia fell behind 
Albania, Serbia and Montenegro in the levels of foreign direct investment it received, marking a 
departure from its position as one of the most popular recipients of foreign funding in previous years. 
Reductions in investment from EU countries played a crucial role in the sharp contraction of FDI in 
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Croatia. Specifically, Austria and the Netherlands - historically two of the largest investors in Croatia - 
both divested in 2010, recording negative inflows of US$ 150 million and US$ 500 million. FDI in 
Bosnia also fell dramatically in 2010, to US$ 230 million, down from US$ 251 in 2009, compounding 
the dramatic 75 percent drop between 2008-2009. In Montenegro FDI fell from US$1.5 billion in 2009 
to $US760 million in 2010, while in Serbia FDI fell from US$ 1.9 billion US$ 1.3 billion.  
Only FYROM and Albania achieved an increase in FDI between 2009 and 2010: FDI in FYROM 
grew to US$ 293 million (from US$ 201 million in 2009), while FDI in Albania reached US$ 1.1 
billion (up from US$ 979 million in 2009). The increase in FDI in Albania can be attributed to some 
privatisations within the strategic sectors and increased investments in the energy, finance and 
telecommunications industries. Overall, between 2009-2010, FDI in the region fell from US$ 8.3 
billion to almost US$ 4 billion (from a peak of US$12.6 billion in 2008). 
Financial sector implications 
The rapid privatisation of the banking sector in the Balkan countries resulted in considerable market 
shares being controlled by European interests.
16
 Over the past decade, European banks and non-bank 
financial institutions (insurance companies) developed a strong presence in the Balkan region. 
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in 2007 European 
banks (mainly Austrian, French, Italian, Dutch, German and Greek) owned 94% of the banking system 
assets in Albania, 82% in Bulgaria, 86% in FYROM, 79% in Montenegro, 87% in Romania and 75% 
in Serbia. 
Since the Balkan countries are very dependent on foreign currency lending - which had mainly 
been provided by foreign (parent) banks to their subsidiaries - the credit squeeze has made it 
increasingly difficult for domestic banks and local companies to refinance their foreign debt holdings, 
leading to decreasing capital flows. Ironically, the banking institutions of Southeast Europe had not 
themselves accumulated the kinds of toxic assets seen in the West; however, many of the parent 
companies of the now almost internationalised industry were heavily exposed. As western financial 
institutions downsized their operations or put their investments on hold the economies of Southeast 
Europe were being frozen out of credit markets and were being sidetracked in their effort to attract 
foreign currency loans.
17 
The crisis also affected the stock markets in the region: the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange index experienced an annual decrease of 67 percent in 2009, while the Belgrade Stock 
Exchange index lost 75 percent. Due to a substantial fall in the share prices in the region most 
privatisation processes in both countries were suspended.
18
  
The crisis also led to a significant increase in the activities of a number of international financial 
institutions in the region, most notably the IMF.
19
 The number of IMF programmes in operation in the 
region had declined from 12 during the period 1994-97 to 3 in 2007; by 2008, only Albania still had a 
lending programme, which ended by the end of the year. But the crisis had exposed most countries to 
destabilising financial gaps on the external accounts. With the supply of capital drying up rapidly, this 
raised the possibility of countries not being able to meet their external obligations, which could lead to 
major depreciations of their currency and/or default. In May 2009 Serbia signed a multi-year 
programme with the IMF which provided it with $US 3.8 billion. The Bosnian authorities signed a 
letter of intent in spring 2009 and a three-year agreement of around $US 2 billion was signed in July 
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2009. The stand-by arrangement included a commitment by the authorities to public sector reform and 
continued implementation of politically difficult cuts to benefits and public sector wages. Although 
this programme was suspended because of the lack of a government and delays in reforms, in July 
2012 a new 2-year $US 500 million IMF standby loan was agreed after the new government adopted a 
budget for 2012. A 2-year precautionary IMF arrangement of €476 million was approved in January 
2011 for FYROM, and was partly used (€ 220 million) to finance the 2011 budget.20 Other institutions 
active in the region – the EBRD, European Investment Bank (EIB) and World Bank – also stepped in 
with their support.
21
 The three institutions provided over $US 33 billion in support for banks and the 
transition economies (including the Western Balkans) in 2009 and 2010. 
II. The second wave: contagion from the Greek (and eurozone) crises 
In its thirteenth year of existence, the European single currency is facing its biggest challenge yet. 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland are on life support, and have received substantial bailout packages to 
keep their economies afloat. Italy and Spain are exhibiting worrying symptoms, combining high public 
debts, large budget deficits and low growth. Germany and France, considered the most robust 
economies of the region, are feeling the strain of supporting their weaker partners, in an attempt to 
save the eurozone. The EU, and the eurozone, are in unprecedented turmoil. 
The eurozone’s weakest link, Greece, has become a great source of instability in Europe. Greece is 
a country in a freefall, experiencing an unprecedented economic meltdown, as well as the 
disintegration of its infrastructure, the degeneration of its political system and the unravelling of its 
social fabric. The austerity packages voted by the Greek parliament over the past year represent the 
most aggressive fiscal and social adjustment in a democratic country in times of peace in post-war 
Europe. After five consecutive years of recession, Greece’s GDP has dropped by almost 20 percent, 
and official unemployment stands at 25.1 percent (and for under 30 year olds, 51 percent).
22
 Industrial 
production and manufacturing have collapsed, while nationwide hundreds of small businesses - once 
the backbone of the economy - are closing by the day. The labour force is experiencing a serious brain 
drain as young educated professionals leave the country in search for better opportunities abroad, 
further decimating the country’s social fabric and prospects of recovery. The past few years have 
witnessed a dramatic surge in crime and homelessness, while one in four Greeks lives below the 
poverty line. The rise of extremism - symbolised by the election of the neo-fascist party Golden Dawn 
to Parliament in June 2012 – is another symptom of the deterioration of social structures and illustrates 
the depth of social and political unrest. The population is worn down and demoralized by the dire 
economic situation, the plummeting standards of living, the lack of prospects for the future and the 
very real fear of a catastrophic exit from the eurozone and the European Union. This previously 
unthinkable scenario has become more and more conceivable. 
As far as the Western Balkan countries are concerned, the crisis in Greece is far more than merely a 
sub-set of the European economic crisis: Greece’s dire predicament and the uncertain outcome of the 
crisis have a tremendous impact on the entire region’s economic growth, political stability and even 
EU prospects. Moreover, a Greek exit from the eurozone could trigger a domino effect of instability 
and insecurity not only in the euro-area, but would undoubtedly also send shock waves throughout its 
neighbouring region. It is indicative that the 2010 EBRD Transition Report highlights the main short-
term challenge for the region as being the survival of “possible contagion effects from economic 
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weaknesses in the eurozone, especially in neighbouring Greece”.23 In terms of fallout from the crisis, 
the worst is not over, both for Greece and its Western Balkan neighbours. 
The most likely channels of contagion from Greece include trade, banking, remittances and FDI 
flows. Due to the interdependence between Greece and the countries of the region, the Greek crisis has 
produced a vicious circle whereby the economic decline of Greece exacerbates the decline of the 
economies of Southeast Europe which feeds back into Greece through inter alia a fall in demand for 
imports from Greece and a fall in the return on Greek investments. Moreover, as Greece is also very 
involved in Bulgaria and Romania (particularly the banking sectors), the negative impact of the Greek 
crisis on these countries will undoubtedly spill over into the Western Balkan economies. 
For Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the trade, investment and financial links with Greece are 
negligible, and the risk of any spillover effects for these two countries is very low. Trade relations 
with Greece are most important for Albania, Montenegro and FYROM, whose exports to Greece 
account for 12-16 percent of the total. There was a sharp decline in exports to Greece in 2009 and the 
first quarter of 2010, as the economic crisis in Greece caused a further reduction in demand for goods 
from these countries.  
Almost 4,000 Greek companies have invested in the region, helping create about 200,000 jobs. 
Albania, Serbia and FYROM are the most vulnerable to negative spillover through reduced FDI flows, 
as Greece ranks first in investments in these countries: in 2008, Greek FDI accounted for over 30 
percent of total investments in Albania, 20 percent in FYROM and 15 percent in Serbia. Greek 
investments were made in a variety of sectors, including infrastructure, services, banking, telecoms, 
food and beverage, heavy industries and pharmaceuticals. A considerable decline in Greek FDI flows 
to the region was evident even before the full impact of the crisis was felt: for example, Greek 
investment in Serbia for the two-year period 2008-2009 amounted to some €46 million, well below the 
total of €336 million for 2007 alone, while in Bulgaria it fell from €545 million in 2007 to €105 in 
2009. In FYROM, Greek investment fell from €15 million euro in 2010, to €2 million in 2011. 
Overall, by 2010, Greek companies had disinvested almost €1.3 billion from the region. 
Another crucial spillover effect from the crisis in Greece relates to the inevitable decline in 
remittances, as it becomes increasingly difficult for migrant workers to stay employed in Greece and 
many are forced to repatriate. Their home countries, in turn, are often unable to absorb them into the 
workforce, thus leading to a further rise in unemployment. A decline in remittances also has a negative 
effect on the countries’ foreign currency holdings, medium-term budgetary planning and the financing 
of their current account deficit. In terms of the potential impact of the Greek crisis on remittances, 
Albania is the most exposed. Some 600,000 Albanians live and work in Greece: in 2009 workers’ 
remittances originating from Greece amounted to at least US$ 900 million (about 8 percent of GDP), 
contributing to domestic economic growth and providing livelihood for many families.
24
 The 
construction sector, in which many Albanians are employed, has culled almost half its workforce, 
down to just 240,000 in 2011 from around 400,000 in 2008. Since migrants can lose their legal status 
if they are jobless for long periods, many are forced to accept work for lower pay or without social 
security benefits. The number of migrant residence permits issued has fallen by 20 percent annually 
since the crisis began. Bulgaria is also affected by a significant decline in remittances from Greece: 
whereas the annual average over the last five years was €400 million, in 2009 these remittances fell by 
11 percent.  
Perhaps the most critical channel of contagion is through the Greek bank subsidiaries operating in 
the region. Greek banks have been particularly active and have invested heavily in the Balkans over 
the last few years, buying local banks and expanding their balance sheets, particularly in high-growth 
areas like consumer and mortgage lending. Seven major Greek banks – including the National Bank of 
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Greece, EFG Eurobank, Piraeus and Alpha Bank - have established a network of around 20 
subsidiaries in the region, with around 1,900 branches and employing approximately 23,500 people. 
By 2007, Greek banks had accumulated a significant market share in the region, accounting for around 
30 percent of total banking assets in Bulgaria and FYROM, 25 percent in Albania, 15 percent in 
Serbia (where three out of 10 banks are Greek) and 17 percent in Romania. 
Subsidiaries are to a significant extent funded with loans from Athens rather than local deposits. 
Even if Greek banks did not withdraw from the region, they would try to grow the local deposit base 
faster than loans, and would be likely to refrain from making fresh loans for a while. Thus, there is a 
risk of Greek banks limiting their credit activity and reducing their exposure in the region as a result of 
funding and liquidity pressures on the Greek parent banks. Significantly, Greek banks that benefited 
from a €28 billion government bailout package in 2009 were encouraged - via a verbal agreement 
between the Greek Finance Ministry, the Bank of Greece and the participating institutions - to use the 
money to support lending at home, not at their subsidiaries in the Balkans. Thus, subsidiary branches 
of Alpha Bank, National Bank of Greece or Eurobank in Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, FYROM and 
Romania did not get a share of the bailout package.  
After 2009, widening spreads on Greek sovereign debt led to increased funding costs for Greek 
banks; faced with such a liquidity squeeze, Greek banks started withdrawing their funds from their 
operations in the Balkans. Consequently, Greek banking sector claims declined by 25% in Romania 
and Bulgaria, and by 18% in Serbia in the two years to December 2011.
25
 This liquidity retreat has not 
only disrupted the financial sectors in the region, but has also had a large impact on the local 
economies, given that all of these countries have bank-based financial systems where much of the 
borrowing activity is made through banks rather than equities or corporate bonds. 
The latest figures from the IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2012) illustrate the depth of the 
impact of the crisis on the Western Balkan economies. Although the September 2011 Report had 
allowed for some cautious optimism - as it had predicted a further upturn of GDP growth for the 
region in 2012, compounding the marginal growth reported for 2011 - in fact the figures deteriorated. 
Thus, as the full impact of the eurozone/Greek crisis hit the Western Balkan economies, the IMF 
adjusted the estimates for GDP growth in 2012 at 0.5 percent for Albania, 0.0 percent for Bosnia, -1.1 
percent for Croatia, 0.9 percent for FYROM, 0.2 percent for Montenegro, and -0.5 percent for Serbia 
(Table 4).  
Table 4: Western Balkans, Economic Indicators 2011, 2012 (estimates) 
 Albania B-H Croatia FYROM Montenegro Serbia 
 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
GDP (% 
change) 
3.0 0.5 1.2 0.0 0.0  -1.1 3.1 0.9 2.4 0.2 1.6 -0.5 
Unemployment 
(%) 
13.3 15.0 27.6 27.6 13.6 14.1 31.2 31.2 - - 24.4 25.5 
Consumer price  
inflation (%) 
3.9 3.5 3.7 2.2 2.2 2.9 3.9 2.0 3.1 2.0 11.2 5.9 
External Debt 
(as % of GDP) 
58.9 63.7 40.3 43.6 47.5 52.7 27.1 46.8 43.3 46.7 50.0 63.6 
Current account  
balance 
(as % of GDP) 
-12.2 -11.7 -8.8 -7.9 -0.8 -1.2 -2.7 -4.0 -19.4 -20.0  -11.5 -12.6 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2012 
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III. The Impact of the European and Greek crises on the Western Balkan EU prospects 
The Eurozone and Greek crises are still unfolding, and the outcome is far from clear. What is clear, 
however, is the fact that both dimensions of the crisis will have a deep and lasting impact on the 
Western Balkan countries, as well as their EU accession prospects. The high “euroisation” of the 
economies of the Western Balkans means a very high vulnerability to eurozone crisis. Crucially, on 
many interlinked and interdependent levels, the eurozone and Greek crises are modifying the 
conditions in which the process of EU enlargement is taking place. 
Impact on economies and fulfillment of economic criteria: backsliding of the reform process 
For most countries in the region, the period 2003-2007 was one of the strongest in more than a decade, 
with annual real GDP growth averaging about 6%. Before the crisis, the Western Balkan countries had 
achieved significant progress in terms of growth, macroeconomic stability, FDI inflows, and were 
progressively moving down the transition path. All these positive factors made it easier to pursue 
reforms and make progress in achieving EU convergence criteria.
26
 The European crisis in general and 
the Greek crisis in particular, have created new, negative realities and conditions under which the 
accession process is being pursued.  
As was discussed above, due to the extremely high interdependence of most of the Western Balkan 
economies with those of the euro-area, the euro-crisis - and particularly the meltdown of the Greek 
economy - have had extremely detrimental repercussions on the economies of the region, in terms of 
macroeconomic performance, FDI, trade flows, remittances etc. In turn, this detrimental impact on the 
economies of the region will make conditionality harder to achieve, while meeting the increasingly 
demanding accession criteria and conditions in the Stabilisation and Association Process will become 
even more difficult. The Western Balkan economies have been caught in a vicious circle, whereby the 
crisis causes deteriorating economic conditions, deteriorating economic conditions mean less reform, 
and less reform means falling behind in the convergence process. It is indicative that the 2011 EBRD 
Transition Report assessed that the achievement of European approximation targets have slowed down 
and that important structural changes – that are a sine qua non for accession – are being postponed, 
stalled, or even reversed. Thus, the setback in economic progress, the slowdown in growth and the 
deteriorating macroeconomic environment will affect the Western Balkan countries’ EU accession 
prospects, as they will find it increasingly difficult to implement the necessary structural reforms that 
are still pending in order for the accession process to progress.  
End of “convergence narrative” (and loss of faith in the transformative power of the EU?) 
Another crucial repercussion of the crisis as far as the Western Balkan countries are concerned is the 
erosion of the “convergence narrative”. Over the past decades, membership in the EU has been 
perceived as a one way path to stability and prosperity. The EU’s Mediterranean enlargement was until 
recently considered an outright success, and the post-authoritarian Spain, Greece and Portugal were 
the models of successful transitions: these countries had used EU membership as a means to 
consolidate democracy, achieve economic prosperity, and secure their place in the progressive 
European family. The EU experience was expected to do the same for the newer members from 
Central and Eastern Europe. The credibility of this narrative has been dealt a serious blow, as the 
current crisis has challenged some strongly held assumptions on the nature of Europeanisation and the 
transformative power of the EU.
27
 The crisis has also raised the question of whether in its current state, 
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and under the current conditions, the EU is still an engine for convergence between core Europe and 
its peripheries. 
Although all of South Europe is in deep crisis, as far as the Western Balkans are concerned it is 
Greece’s predicament that has a dramatic impact on the candidate countries’ perception of the 
“convergence narrative”. Greece was one of the region’s success stories: a quintessentially Balkan 
country that had made the transition from underdevelopment and marginality to prosperity and 
stability, under the aegis of the European Union. A bridge between the Balkans and Europe, Greece 
was the only Balkan country that was also a member of both the EU and NATO. Greece’s downfall 
illustrates, in the most painful way possible, that EU membership is not a one-way, irreversible 
guarantee of stability and prosperity. For the Western Balkan countries, the example of Greece no 
longer symbolises the promise of modernisation and convergence with the rich and well-governed 
countries of ‘old Europe’, but the taste of capitalism and the prospect of prosperity gone sour. If “the 
system” did not take hold in Greece, and did not take hold in Spain and Portugal, how can it be 
expected to work in regions as problematic as the Western Balkans? Moreover, the Greek crisis and 
the deepening political chaos (including the rise of extremist elements) are sending worrying signals to 
a region still struggling to establish western-style democracies. Crucial questions are being raised 
regarding deep structural reforms and institutional change: if Greece, a member of the EU since 1981, 
has not been able to successfully tackle problems like corruption, tax evasion, clientelism, vested 
interests, etc, what does this mean for the Western Balkans? In fact, Greece is a warning about the 
perils of “Europeanisation without deeper transformation”.28  
Intensification of “enlargement fatigue” 
The “enlargement fatigue” - which set in after the unprecedented rounds of enlargement during the 
period 2004-2007 - has been exacerbated by the economic crisis, due to which many EU member 
states prefer to give priority to their own problems. Faced with an unprecedented economic slowdown, 
rising unemployment, the sovereign debt crisis, bailouts for several eurozone countries, and a 
widespread sense of insecurity throughout the Union, the EU is currently focussed on domestic 
political and economic issues, with further enlargement moving down as a priority on the agenda. It is 
indicative that the Eurobarometer 76 (published in December 2011) showed that only 36 percent of the 
surveyed population of the EU-27 supported the idea of further enlargement (down from 47 percent in 
May 2009, before the full brunt of the crisis was felt throughout Europe). The numbers vary from 
country to country: the newer members (from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements) were more in favour 
of further enlargement (with Poland leading with a 69 percent approval rate, followed by Lithuania 
with 60 percent), while in the older members such as Germany, France, and Belgium supporting rates 
were mostly between 30-35 percent. Austria and France were the most vehemently opposed, with 70 
and 71 percent of the population opposing further enlargement.  
It is clear that all EU members have become more skeptical, cautious, introverted and fearful of the 
implications of further expansion during this critical period. Enlargement is not at the top of the EU 
agenda, and in the current context of increased protectionist mentalities, fear of further contagion, 
international instability and the loss of sense of solidarity that used to be taken for granted, it is 
difficult to imagine it moving there anytime soon. Clearly the shock of the Greek crisis and the 
subsequent contagion to other South European states has made most EU member states even more 
hesitant to embrace more “dysfunctional”, unreliable states. If the eurozone (and maybe even the EU 
itself) is willing to shed “deviant” members, the consensus is that it will be slow to accept other, 
potentially precarious states. Therefore, the euro crisis may not have “killed” enlargement – as 
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Croatia’s imminent accession in July 2013 proves - but “it is relegating the region to the outermost 
circle in a multi-speed Europe – the periphery of the periphery”.29  
…and growing “evaluation fatigue” (and disillusionment with the EU?) 
Crucially, support for EU integration has declined on the Balkan side as well. Analysts have warned 
that the increasingly complicated and drawn-out enlargement process shows the contrast between the 
EU’s plan to accept the Western Balkans and its actual implementation. This is where “enlargement 
fatigue” within the EU meets “evaluation fatigue” in the Balkans: the increasingly negative economic 
environment in the EU, coupled with the inevitable drawing out of the accession process, has resulted 
in the erosion of popular support for EU accession in the Western Balkans, as the population of these 
countries is finding it more difficult to maintain enthusiasm for the convergence process. 
A survey conducted by Gallup Balkan Monitor in November 2010 disclosed a largely pessimistic 
population with little trust of domestic institutions and falling enthusiasm for the EU, especially when 
compared to the previous year.
30
 Although the majority of citizens of the region still see the EU as the 
only long-term option, enthusiasm for joining the EU was generally on the decline, mostly due to what 
the population perceived as “a lack of concrete commitment” on behalf of the EU. However, the 
Western Balkan region is not a monolithic group with uniform views of Europe. Surveys show a 
considerable divergence of opinions, ranging from enthusiasm (Albania and Kosovo) to skepticism 
(Serbia and Croatia). Crucially, even in the more “enthusiastic” candidates, support has fallen 
compared to previous years.
31
 
This lack of enthusiasm could also translate into lack of commitment to the necessary reforms 
regarding the political, economic and acquis criteria in the Western Balkans. In many cases, political 
elites of the region pay lip service to EU membership, conditionality and reforms but in reality they 
are concerned with safeguarding their position domestically and with business as usual, which means 
rent seeking and clientelism rather than genuine reform effort. Economic stagnation is thus 
accompanied by political standstill and in one or two cases backsliding towards authoritarianism. 
The EU may still be considered the only game in town for the Western Balkans but it seems that 
the prevailing sentiment is Eurorealism, not Europhilia.
32
 Croatia’s membership referendum in January 
2012 is very indicative of the general apathy, as there was only a 43 percent turnout to ratify the 
country’s accession agreement. EU is the necessary option, not a source of inspiration or a stimulus for 
deep change and reform. This disillusionment concerning the EU and what membership actually can 
deliver is inextricably linked to the breakdown of the “convergence narrative”, discussed above. 
Consequently, the loss of enthusiasm on behalf of the Western Balkans is also fuelled by the 
uncertainty regarding the characteristics of the Union these countries are trying to join. Will it be 
multi-leveled, multi-speed, less democratic, less tolerant of failure, with diminishing solidarity 
between member states, and with the Western Balkan states firmly entrenched in the “periphery of the 
periphery”? 
A (further) discrediting of the Balkan region 
The Greek crisis has created other - non-quantifiable but very potent - repercussions, namely the 
further discrediting of the Balkan region. Greece, the first Balkan country to join the EU (in 1981) has 
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been exposed as a country that not only ran ruinous and reckless fiscal policies for many years, but 
deceived its partners with false data in order to join the Eurozone in 2002. Even as the crisis is 
unfolding, and Greece is under IMF supervision, the country has apparently achieved very little in 
terms of real structural reforms, including dealing with tax evasion, corruption and lack of government 
transparency. The Greek predicament is being used by enlargement skeptics to propagate the 
perception of the entire Balkan region as an unreliable area of corruption and instability, where very 
little real convergence with EU criteria has been actually achieved. The Greek crisis has exacerbated 
what was already an apprehensive environment in Brussels towards the Balkan region, which already 
had been fuelled by the unsatisfactory experience of the last enlargement that brought Romania and 
Bulgaria into the EU.
33
 Since corruption, organised crime and judicial inefficiency remain serious 
problems in Bulgaria and Romania, there is a strong perception that in the 2007 enlargement the EU 
did not apply the accession criteria correctly; moreover, once a member, a country has little incentive 
to change. 
The negative perceptions of the region due to the experiences with Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece, 
serve to compound the very real problems of corruption and organised crime in most of the candidate 
countries. The road towards integration into the EU will definitely be longer if fragile and unreformed 
institutional structures, a weak rule of law, and largely corruption-based economies and organised 
crime flourish. Corruption not only harms economic growth and development, it distorts markets and 
fair competition, undermines the rule of law, damages government legitimacy, erodes the private 
sector and contributes to greater income inequality.
34
 In the context of the Western Balkans’ accession 
path, it would appear that the current difficult economic conditions make these necessary reforms and 
changes even more difficult to implement. 
Table 5 presents the Corruption Perception Index for the Western Balkans, as calculated by 
Transparency International (out of a total of 183 countries worldwide). The Table shows that Croatia 
was the best placed in 2011, while Albania was ranked the lowest of all the Western Balkan countries. 
Compared to 2004, all countries except Bosnia have improved their standing over the past few years. 
It is also interesting to compare the Corruption Perception Index of the Western Balkan countries to 
those of other EU countries, members that joined in 2004, in 2007, or even Greece. It is worth pointing 
out that many countries experienced a drop in their ranks between 2009 and 2011, a fact that supports 
the premise that pursuing and implementing the necessary measures against corruption and in favour 
of transparency is more difficult during times of economic crisis. 
Table 5: Corruption Perception Index  
 Rank  Rank 
W. Balkans 2004 2009 2011 Other EU 2004 2009 2011 
Albania 108 95 95 Slovenia 31 27 35 
B-H 82 99 91 Poland 67 49 41 
Croatia 67 66 37 Slovakia 57 56 59 
FYROM 97 71 69 Romania 87 71 75 
Montenegro  - 69 66 Bulgaria 54 71 86 
Serbia  97 83 86 Greece 49 71 80 
Source: 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (www.transparency.org) 
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Thus, although fighting corruption and organised crime in the Western Balkan countries is a 
prerequisite for EU accession, the already challenging task of eradicating organised crime networks, 
establishing the rule of law, creating an independent judiciary, and ensuring transparency, is being 
made all the more difficult by the unfavourable economic environment. 
Loss of an ally 
Finally, the Greek crisis may affect the Western Balkans’ accession prospects on another level as well. 
For several years, Greece was the Western Balkans “enlargement ambassador” to the EU; since 2003 
Greece had made enlargement towards the Balkans a cornerstone of its foreign policy and had 
promoted it actively with the EU institutions. Its “Agenda 2014” aimed at achieving accession of all 
Western Balkan countries to the EU by 2014, as part of a plan to promote peace, security and 
democracy in the region. Now, hugely indebted, discredited and facing years of austerity, Greece’s 
days as a regional champion are well and truly over. Greece no longer has the clout, the prestige or the 
capacity to play the role of the “champion” of Balkan enlargement, or to be a bridge between Brussels 
and the Balkans. This void leaves the candidate countries without an enthusiastic ally in less-than 
enthusiastic Brussels, adding yet another negative dimension to the enlargement picture.  
Conclusions and Future Outlook 
There is no doubt that the timeline of the EU’s Western Balkan enlargement is unfolding under 
extremely unfavourable conditions. As far as the EU is concerned, accession of the Western Balkan 
countries continues to be its official regional policy. EU officials have repeatedly stated that they 
remain committed to the integration of the Western Balkans into the bloc, dismissing fears of 
“enlargement fatigue” in the wake of the Greek financial crisis. In practice, however, and under 
growing pressure as a result of the financial crisis, Europeans seem to be increasingly divided about 
what to do with the Balkans, and have adopted a “wait-and-see” policy.35 Some policymakers 
increasingly view the prospect of enlargement into the Balkans with alarm, with potentially 
destabilising political, social and economic repercussions. Other policymakers, however, see 
postponing the accession of the Western Balkans indefinitely as an even greater risk that could 
undermine the fragile progress that has been made in the region.
36
 They posit that the promise of EU 
integration has not only been the catalyst for reforms, but also the political glue that has held the 
Balkans together this past decade.
37
  
However, as was discussed above, the current crisis has challenged some strongly held convictions 
concerning the nature of Europeanisation and the transformative power of the EU. The shocking 
impact of the crisis on the entire Southern flank of the EU has also raised the question of whether the 
EU is still willing and able to be an engine for convergence between core Europe and its peripheries. 
Divided between the fear of a hasty enlargement and the fear of a slow one, the EU has been losing 
influence across the Balkans, as the region’s leaders and population start to doubt the sincerity of the 
EU’s commitment – and the need to pursue EU-mandated reforms. If the enlargement process is to be 
kept on track, the European Union must reclaim its “soft power” in the region, and build on its 
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position of creating incentives for reform and progress, rather than risk sowing disillusionment and the 
possibility of regression.
38
  
These are difficult times for Western Balkan politics. The economic crisis in Greece and other EU 
member states has deeply affected the already weak economies of the region and deepened the mood 
of uncertainty. The fact remains that despite the danger of delaying enlargement indefinitely, it is 
difficult to interest EU leaders in the Balkans at the moment. Nonetheless, Croatia’s accession in July 
2013, the decision to start negotiation talks with Montenegro and the granting of candidate status to 
Serbia are a step in the right direction. In the midst of the Greek crisis, Commission President Barroso 
declared that “we see the countries of the region as members of the European family of nations, we see 
them all as part of Europe. Their roots, their present and their future are in Europe”.39 The Western 
Balkans are indeed the European Union’s final frontier, but there is a long way to go before these 
words become reality. 
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